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Abstract 
 
The purpose of this study is to assess how information sharing offices affect loan price and 
quantity in the African banking industry. The empirical evidence is based on a panel of 162 
banks in 42 countries for the period 2001-2011.  From the Generalised Method of Moments, 
public credit registries decrease loan price. With instrumental Quantile Regressions, two main 
findings are established. Public credit registries consistently decrease the price of loans 
whereas private credit bureaus consistently have the opposite effect. Public credit registries 
increase loan quantity in bottom quintiles (or banks associated with lower loan quantities) 
while private credit bureaus increase loan quantity in top quintiles (or banks associated with 
higher loan quantities).  
 
JEL Classification: G20, G29, O16, O55 
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1. Introduction 
Access to finance remains a fundamental problem in African development because 
less than 20% of households on the continent have access to financial services in the formal 
banking sector (IFAD, 2011; Asongu et al., 2016a).  Consistent with the narrative, some of 
the documented factors restricting financial access include: limited communication 
infrastructure, low population densities and poor transport facilities. Even in regions that are 
characterised with substantial formal financial services, small corporations and some 
households may still be confronted with issues of lending requirements like collateral and 
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strict documentation. Furthermore, when the fundamental lending requirements are fulfilled, 
substantial minimum saving requirements and high cost (e.g. transaction fees) could still limit 
access to finance.  
A number of solutions have been documented on mechanisms by which such 
constraints to financial access can be addressed. These solutions that are associated with 
surplus liquidity are measures that can be employed to limit the involuntary and voluntary 
keeping of excess cash by financial institutions (see Saxegaard, 2006; Asongu, 2014, p.70). 
On the one hand, measures that can be used to curb voluntary keeping of surplus cash include: 
(i) aiding financial institutions to trace their positions at the level of central banks in order to 
prevent them from holding cash reserves above statutory requirements; (ii) strengthening 
institutions that facilitate lending between banks and (iii) boosting infrastructure and 
transportation so that banks in remote zones are not constrained to hold excess liquidity 
because of logistic reasons. On the other hand, the involuntary holding of cash by banks can 
be restricted by inter alia: (i) increasing the lending capacity of banks in situation of regulated 
interest rate; (ii)  creating a favourable atmosphere that enables commercial banks to use bond 
markets as investment avenues for their surplus liquidity; (iii) boosting investment 
possibilities for regional banks through regional stock market promotion and (iv) decreasing 
contractions in lending by  banks via measures that reduce information asymmetry and 
encourage  interbank  competition. The present inquiry is situated within the framework of the 
last point on information asymmetry.  
Information sharing offices were introduced across Africa during the past decade in 
order to mitigate information asymmetry between lenders and borrowers in the banking 
industry. Unfortunately, a recent stream of literature on information asymmetry in the African 
banking industry is motivated by the fear that information sharing offices are not meeting 
their anticipated effects of increasing financial assess (Triki & Gajigo, 2014). As a case in 
point, Asongu et al. (2016b) have established that the impacts of information sharing offices 
have negatively affected a plethora of financial development indicators. Furthermore, as we 
shall observe in the literature review section below, very limited scholarly attention has been 
devoted to examine the impact of information sharing offices on financial access in the 
continent.  
Noticeably from the literature we shall engage in the section that follows, studies have 
fundamentally focused on developed nations, which in comparative terms have less concerns 
in financial access. In essence, whereas a great bulk of the literature has been positioned on 
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the emerging economies of Asia and Latin America on the one hand and the Organisation for  
Economic Cooperation and Development countries on the one hand, Africa which has severe 
issues of financial access has not received the scholarly attention it deserves (Asongu et al., 
2016b).  To put this point into perspective, Galindo and Miller (2001) have not involved any 
African country, while Love and Mylenko (2003) have used four countries. Whereas Barth et 
al. (2009) have focused on nine countries, Triki and Gajigo (2014), which is closest to the 
present inquiry have investigated 42 African countries for the period 2006-2009 using Probit 
models.  This inquiry steers clear of Triki and Gajigo (2014) both from data and 
methodological standpoints. On the one hand, the periodicity is for the period 2001-2011. On 
the other hand, Generalised Method of Moments (GMM) and Instrumental Variable Quantile 
Regressions (IV QR) are employed.  
The latter estimation technique is relevant because Triki and Gajigo (2014) have 
modelled the nexus between financial access and information sharing at the conditional mean 
of financial access. However, it is important to assess the linkages throughout the conditional 
distributions of financial access in order to emphasise banks that are characterised with high, 
intermediate and low levels of financial access. From a policy perspective, such distinctions 
are relevant because blanket policies are unlikely to succeed unless they are contingent on 
initial levels of financial access and tailored differently across banks characterised with 
varying levels of financial access.  
Furthermore, Triki and Gajigo (2014) have recognised their failure to account for 
endogeneity. In this study, the specifications are tailored to have some bite on endogeneity, 
notably, by: (i) controlling simultaneity and time invariant omitted variables with the GMM 
technique and (ii) accounting for the unobserved heterogeneity and simultaneity with the 
IVQR approach.    
In a nutshell, the purpose of this inquiry is to address the highlighted research gaps by 
assessing whether the introduction of information sharing offices has decreased the price of 
loans and increased the quantity of loans
1
. The inquiry is of policy relevance because results 
could inform policy markers on instruments that can be used to enhance financial access in 
order to enable small businesses as well as poor households maximise their earnings and 
savings for more employment and productivity that culminate in higher economic growth
2
. 
                                                          
1
 The term financial access is used interchangeably with ‘loan price’ and/or ‘loan quantity’ throughout this study.  
2
 The relationship between finance and growth has been substantially documented in the literature (Owosu & 
Odhiambo, 2014; Nyasha & Odhiambo, 2015a, 2015b). 
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The rest of the paper is organised in the following manner. Section 2 discusses the 
background, theoretical underpinnings and empirical literature. Section 3 covers the data and 
methodology whereas the empirical results are presented and discussed in Section 4. Section 5 
concludes with implications and future research directions. 
 
2. Background, theoretical underpinnings and empirical literature  
2.1 Background  
 Credit reference agencies or information sharing offices  are establishments that are 
designed to gather information on the debts of individual and commercial borrowers from 
multiple sources, namely, from: direct examination and public sources (usually for 
corporations), credit card companies and banks (usually for individuals) and retail lenders 
(Tchamyou  & Asongu, 2017). After the data collection process and cross-checking for a 
detailed report, the information   is then consolidated. Such information from some credit 
histories can entail both negative and positive signals: (i) negative information which consists 
for the most part of default data and (ii) positive information which encompasses histories on 
repayment behaviour as well as closed and open credits.  
 Before the year 2008, data on information sharing offices were mostly established in a 
few countries, notably: for the emerging markets of Asia and Latin America and the 
Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development countries (see Mylenko, 2008).  
The global financial crisis, coupled with the burgeoning information and communication 
technology has prompted the establishment of information sharing centres across Africa. It is 
important to note that with the exception of South Africa, only a handful of counties in Sub-
Saharan Africa had credit reference bureaus before 2008.  Moreover, the roles of such credit 
agencies were for the most part limited to the supervision of the banking sector in the few 
countries, inter alia: Rwanda, Nigeria and Mozambique. Unfortunately, lending rates 
remained high for a number of factors: lack of relevant incentives and technology and the 
incapacity of the credit agencies to disclose accurate and timely information on borrowers’ 
history.  On the growing demand from supervisors to consolidate practices of risk 
management as well as requirements from other financial institutions, many countries (e.g. 
Zambia, Uganda, Tanzania, Nigeria and Ghana) responded before 2008 by instituting private 
credit bureaus.  
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2.2 Theoretical highlights  
  
 There are two main perspectives in the literature on the theoretical linkage between 
information sharing offices and financial access (see Claus & Grimes, 2003). The first view 
articulates liquidity provisions by banks whereas the second perspective is oriented towards 
the capacity of banks to improve on the risk features of assets. Both perspectives however are 
grounded on the fundamental mission of financial intermediation which is to improve 
allocation efficiency by converting mobilised resources into credit.  The theoretical 
underpinnings on which the mission of financial intermediation is emphasised build on the 
literature of imperfect market information. In essence, the main task of financial 
intermediaries is to decrease information and transaction costs resulting from information 
asymmetry between borrowers and lenders in the banking industry. Therefore, it is for the 
purpose of reducing such information asymmetry that information sharing offices were 
introduced in Africa over the past decade. 
 In the light of the above, the nexus between information sharing offices and financial 
access is apparent from two perspectives, namely: the mitigation of moral hazard on the part 
of borrowers and reduction of adverse selection from the side of lenders. On the one hand, 
information sharing offices enable banks to have a comprehensive picture of borrowers’ credit 
histories. Enhanced knowledge on borrowers’ information avoids additional interest rates that 
would otherwise have been imposed by banks to compensate for adverse selection.  On the 
other hand, borrowers have the luxury of moral hazard once they have been granted loans 
because they can conceal activities to which the loan was granted with the agenda of limiting 
or avoiding compliance with their financial obligations towards banks. It is therefore the 
responsibility of information sharing offices to discipline borrowers on the risks of defaulting 
on their debts, especially on the short-sightedness of defaulting because they want to resort to 
the informal financial sector as a viable alternative to the formal financial sector. By acting as 
a market disciplining device, information sharing offices can mitigate the moral hazard of 
borrowers.  In a nutshell: (i) ex-ante of lending, information sharing offices decrease adverse 
selection while (ii) ex-post of lending, these offices mitigate moral hazard. Within the former 
framework, loan price and loan quantity are expected to increase.  
 
2.3 Empirical literature  
Much of the literature on the linkage between information asymmetry and financial 
development has focused on: (i) the influence more information or data has on creditors’ 
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rights and (ii) the consequences of increasing information sharing among creditors. For the 
most part, the former perspective has been oriented towards how consolidated creditors’ rights 
affect risk-taking by financial institutions and bankruptcy (Cleassens & Klapper, 2005; 
Houston et al., 2010; Djankov et al., 2011; Acharya et al., 2011). The latter perspective is 
focused on how information sharing offices:  increase credit availability (Triki & Gajigo, 
2014; Brown et al., 2009; Djankov et al., 2007); reduce rates of default (Jappelli & Pagano, 
2002); mitigate the cost of credit (Brown et al., 2009); affect antitrust intervention 
(Coccorese, 2012); influence syndicated bank loans (Tanjung et al., 2010; Ivashina, 2009) and 
impact lending that is related to corruption (Barth et al., 2009).  
Galindo and Miller (2001) have investigated how mitigating information asymmetry 
affects financial access to establish that developed nations that have credit registries are more 
associated with lower degrees of restrictions in access to finance when compared to less 
developed countries with credit bureaus. Love and Mylenko (2000) have used a combination 
of public credit registries and private credit bureaus with firm-related data from the World 
Bank Business Environment Survey to examine whether increased information sharing 
decrease constraints in financial access, as perceived by managers. The results demonstrate 
that private credit bureaus are associated with higher levels of financial access while public 
credit registries do not have any substantial effect on mitigating financial access constraints.  
Barth et al. (2009) have examined the effect of: (i) information asymmetry and (ii) 
lender and borrower competition on corruption-related lending via information sharing offices 
by employing data from the World Bank Business Environment Survey. Two main results are 
established. On the one hand, corrupt-oriented lending is mitigated by banking competition 
and increasing information sharing positively affects the mitigating tendency. On the other 
hand, corrupt-oriented lending is influenced by the ownership structure of firms, the legal 
environment and competition among firms.  
Asongu et al. (2016b) have assessed information sharing thresholds at which reducing 
information asymmetry enhances financial development to establish that information sharing 
offices negatively affect financial access for the most part. The results show that information 
sharing offices negatively influence financial depth with the magnitude from public credit 
registries comparatively higher relative to private credit bureaus. Private credit bureaus have a 
higher incidence on banking system efficiency while the impact of public credit registries is 
insignificant. Information sharing offices have negative impacts on financial activity with the 
incidence from private credit bureaus comparatively lower.  
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Triki and Gajigo (2014) which is closest to this inquiry have assessed two main 
concerns, notably: the effect of information sharing offices on financial access by businesses 
and the impact of public credit registries’ design on financial access constraints. Two 
principal results are established. First, there is considerable heterogeneity in access to finance 
and how information sharing offices are designed with public credit registries. Second, 
financial access is comparatively more pronounced in nations that are characterised with more 
private credit bureaus compared to nations with public credit registries or no information 
sharing offices.  
 
3. Data and Methodology 
3.1 Data  
 The study examines a panel of 162 banks in 42 countries with data from Bankscope 
and the World Bank Development Indicators for the period 2001-2011. The number of 
countries, banks and periodicity is due to data availability constraints. Accordingly, data on 
information sharing offices is only available from 2001. Consistent with Coccorese and 
Pellecchia (2010), dependent variables for ‘loan price’ and ‘loan quantity’ are respectively 
the ‘price charged on loans’ and ‘logarithms of loans’.  
 In accordance with Triki and Gajigo (2014), information sharing offices are measured 
with public credit registries and private credit bureaus.  The present inquiry controls for 
market-level characteristics (GDP per capita growth, inflation and population density), bank-
oriented features (Deposits/Assets and Bank branches) and the unobserved heterogeneity in 
bank: ownership (foreign versus (vs) domestic), size (large vs. small) and ‘compliance with 
Sharia finance’ (Islamic vs. non-Islamic).  
 With regards to bank-oriented features, the following expected signs are anticipated. 
First, the ‘deposit to asset ratio’ is expected to increase the price and quantity of loans. 
Accordingly, given that deposits are the main sources of finance for banks, a higher 
proportion of deposits among liquid liabilities could augment the quantity of loans (and 
interest margins) given that good organisation is required for management and mobilisation. 
Second, from intuition, the number of bank branches should positively (negatively) affect the 
quantity (price) of loans due to a competition-impact that brings-down prices while 
augmenting quantity.  
 As concerns market-related characteristics, the following are worthwhile. First, while 
GDP per capita growth which has been included to control for business cycle fluctuations is 
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intuitively expected to positively influence the quantity of loans, the expected sign on loan 
price remains ambiguous because it depends on market expansion and dynamism. 
Nonetheless, decreasing GDP per capita is likely to affect loan price and loan quantity due to 
low demand.  Therefore, negative signs are expected because over the past decade, GDP per 
capita has been depleting in most African countries because GDP growth has been increasing 
at a lower rate than population growth (Asongu, 2013a).  Second, population density should 
affect both quantity and price of loans positively. Accordingly, more demand in bank loans 
due to high population density drives-up the price of loans. Third, inflation should increase 
(decrease) the price (quantity) of loans. Investors have been documented to prefer investing in 
less ambiguous economic environments (see Le Roux & Kelsey, 2016; Kelsey & Le Roux, 
2016). Accordingly, there is likely to be less investment (or quantity of loans) in periods of 
economic uncertainty (like high inflation) and therefore the price of loans is expected to 
increase with uncertainty in inflation because interest rates are adjusted for inflation.  
 It is difficult to establish the expected signs of the dummy variables used to control for 
the unobserved heterogeneity. For instance, bank size (small vs. big) could be linked to both 
positive and negative impacts on loan dynamics, contingent on the organisation and co-
ordination of concerns linked with larger bank size. Moreover, dealing with more branches 
that are associated with big banks can also generate inefficiencies due to concerns 
encountered while meeting customer requirements and needs. Within the same perspective, 
the incidence of ownership (foreign vs. domestic) and compliance with Sharia finance 
(Islamic vs. non-Islamic) is contingent on a multitude of factors, inter alia: organizational 
capabilities of staff and dynamism and expansion of markets. The expected signs of the 
control variables are disclosed in Appendix 1 while the definition of variables and 
corresponding sources are provided in Appendix 2. The summary statistics and correlation 
matrix are disclosed respectively in Appendix 3   and Appendix 4.  
 
3.2 Methodology 
3.2.1 Generalised methods of moments: specification, identification and exclusion restrictions  
 The GMM empirical strategy is adopted for five main reasons; the first-two are basic 
requirements for employing the technique whereas the last-three are advantages that are 
linked to the choice of the empirical strategy. First, the technique accounts for persistence in 
loan quantity and price since the criterion for persistence are met. Accordingly, the 
correlations between loan quantity and price and their first lags are respectively 0.996 and 
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0.845 which are above the 0.800 criterion used to ascertain persistence in dependent variables. 
Second, the N (or 162)>T(or 11) criterion for the employment of the GMM technique is also 
met because the number of cross sections is higher than the number of time series in each 
cross section. Third, the technique controls for endogeneity in all regressors by employing 
instrumental values of regressors and accounting for time invariant omitted variables. Fourth, 
the system GMM estimator also corrects for small sample biases in the difference GMM 
estimator. Fifth, cross-country differences are considered in the specifications.  
Whereas the system GMM estimator (see Blundell & Bond, 1998; Arellano & Bond, 
1995) has been documented (see Bond et al., 2001, pp. 3-4) to have better properties than the 
difference estimator (Arellano & Bond, 1991), this inquiry adopts the Roodman (2009ab) 
extension of Arellano and Bover (1995) that employs forward orthogonal deviations as 
opposed to first differences  because the technique  has been documented to limit instrument 
proliferation and restrict over-identification (see Baltagi, 2008; Love & Zicchino, 2006).  A 
two-step approach is preferred to the one-step specification because it controls for 
heteroscedasticity.  
The following equations in levels (1) and first difference (2) summarize the standard 
system GMM estimation procedure for loan prices.   
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Where: tiP ,  
is the loan price of bank i
 
at  period t ; tiPCR , , represents public credit  registries 
whereas tiPCB ,  denotes private credit bureaus; 0  
is a constant;
 
 is the degree of auto-
regression; W  is the vector of control variables  (GDP per capita growth, Inflation, 
Population density, Deposit/Assets  and Bank Branches),
 i

 
is the country-specific effect, t  
is the time-spe cific constant  and ti ,  the error term. Dummy variables are not included in the 
GMM specifications because fixed effects are eliminated.   Eqs (1) and (2) are replicated 
when the dependent variable is loan quantity.  
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 It is important to allocate space to engage identification and exclusion restrictions.  
Consistent with recent literature, all explanatory variables are acknowledged as predetermined 
or suspected endogenous while only years are treated as strictly exogenous (see  Dewan & 
Ramaprasad, 2014; Asongu & Nwachukwu, 2016a), principally  because it is not apparent for 
years to become endogenous in first-difference (see Roodman, 2009b). Hence, the approach 
for treating ivstyle (years) is ‘iv(years, eq(diff))’ while the gmmstyle is used for suspected 
endogenous variables.  
 In the light of the above, years or strictly exogenous instruments affect the outcome 
variables exclusively via the endogenous explaining or predetermined variables. Moreover, 
the statistical validity of the exclusion restriction is investigated with the Difference in Hansen 
Test (DHT) for instrument exogeneity. In essence, the alternative hypothesis of this test 
should be rejected in order for the instruments to elicit the outcome variables exclusively 
through the suspected endogenous variables. Therefore, while in the standard instrumental 
variable (IV) technique, a rejection of the null hypothesis of the Sargan Overidentifying 
Restrictions (OIR) test indicates that the instruments explain the outcome variables beyond 
the suspected endogenous variables (see Beck et al., 2003; Asongu & Nwachukwu, 2016b), in 
the GMM approach which uses forward orthogonal deviations, the information criterion used 
to investigate if years exhibit strict exogeneity is the DHT.  In the results that are reported in 
Section 4, the exclusion restriction assumption is validated if the null hypothesis of the DHT 
corresponding to IV (year, eq(diff)) is  not rejected. 
 
3.2.2 Instrumental Quantile regressions 
 In order to control for initial levels of loan quantity and loan price, the inquiry is 
consistent with the literature on conditional determinants by adopting a Quantile Regressions 
(QR) estimation approach (see Keonker & Hallock, 2001; Billger & Goel, 2009; Okada & 
Samreth, 2012; Asongu, 2013b). Accordingly, the QR approach consists of investigating the 
relationship between information sharing offices and the outcome variables throughout the 
conditional distributions of the outcome variables.  
 The existing information sharing literature has focused on the conditional mean of 
financial access (see  Triki & Gajigo, 2014; Asongu et al., 2016b). Whereas mean effects are 
important, we extend the literature by using an estimation approach that accounts for initial 
levels of loan price and quantity. Moreover, studies that articulate mean impacts with 
Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) are founded on the assumption of normally distributed error 
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terms. This hypothesis of error terms that are normally distributed does not hold with QR. 
Moreover, the QR approach enables the inquiry to assess the relationship between information 
sharing and financial access with particular emphasis on banks with high, intermediate and 
low levels of loan and quantity price. The QR approach which is robust to the presence of 
outliers therefore enables investigation of parameter estimates at various points of the 
conditional distribution of the outcome variable (Koenker & Bassett, 1978).  
 The issue of endogeneity is tackled by employing an Instrumental Variable QR 
(IVQR) procedure. The instrumentation procedure for an information sharing office (e.g. 
public credit registries) is in Eq. (3) below. 
  titijti PCRPCR ,1,,                                                                                                   (3) 
Where: tiPCR , , is the public credit registries indicator of bank i  
at  period t ,    is a 
constant, 1, tiPCR , represents  public credit registries   in bank i  
at  period 1t , and ti ,  the 
error term. The instrumentation procedure consists of regressing the information asymmetry 
independent variables of interest on their first lags and then saving the fitted values that are 
subsequently used as the main independent variables in Eq. (4). The specifications are 
Heteroscedasticity and Autocorrelation Consistent (HAC) in standard errors. The  th quintile 
estimator of financial access is obtained by solving for the following optimization problem, 
which is presented without subscripts for simplicity in Eq. (4) 
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Where  1,0 . As opposed to OLS which is fundamentally based on minimizing the sum of 
squared residuals, with QR, the weighted sum of absolute deviations are minimised. For 
example, the 25
th
 or 75
th
 quintiles (with  =0.25 or 0.75 respectively) are assessed by 
approximately weighing the residuals. The conditional quintile of financial access or iy given 
ix is: 
 iiy xxQ )/(                                                                                                      (5) 
Where unique slope parameters are modelled for each  th specific quintile. This formulation 
is analogous to ixxyE )/( in the OLS slope where parameters are investigated only at 
the mean of the conditional distribution of loan price and quantity. For the model in Eq. (5), 
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the dependent variable iy  is either loan price or loan quantity while ix  contains a constant 
term, Public credit registries, Private credit bureaus, GDP per capita growth, Inflation, 
Population density, Deposit/Assets, Bank Branches, Small banks, domestic banks and Islamic 
banks. 
 
4. Empirical results  
4.1 Presentation of results  
Table 1 and Table 2 present GMM findings related respectively to loan price and loan 
quantity.  Each table has three sets of specifications corresponding to public credit registries, 
private credit bureaus and information sharing offices (including both public credit registries 
and private credit bureaus). The full sample is from 2001-2011 whereas the partial sample is 
from 2005-2011. The partial sample is adopted for a twofold reason. First, it enables the study 
to limit instrument proliferation or over-identification because T is reduced. Second, data on 
information sharing offices in most countries are from the year 2005. Four principal 
information criteria are employed to assess the validity of the GMM model with forward 
orthogonal deviations
3
. Based on the information criteria it can be established that public 
credit registries decrease loan price. The significant control variables have expected signs.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
3
 “First, the null hypothesis of the second-order Arellano and Bond autocorrelation test (AR(2)) in difference for 
the absence of autocorrelation in the residuals should not be rejected. Second the Sargan and Hansen 
overidentification restrictions (OIR) tests should not be significant because their null hypotheses are the 
positions that instruments are valid or not correlated with the error terms. In essence, while the Sargan OIR test 
is not robust but not weakened by instruments, the Hansen OIR is robust but weakened by instruments. In order 
to restrict identification or limit the proliferation of instruments, we have ensured that instruments are lower 
than the number of cross-sections in most specifications. Third, the Difference in Hansen Test (DHT) for 
exogeneity of instruments isalso employed to assess the validity of results from the Hansen OIR test. Fourth, a 
Fischer test for the joint validity of estimated coefficients is also provided” (Asongu & De Moor, 2017, p.200) 
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Table 1: Price Effects of Reducing Information Asymmetry  
       
 Dependent Variable: Price of Loans 
       
 Public  Credit Registries (PCR) Private Credit Bureaus (PCB) Information Sharing Offices 
 Full Sample Partial Sample Full Sample Partial Sample Full Sample Partial Sample 
Constant  -0.001 -0.038 -0.006 0.176*** -0.004 -0.078 
 (0.912) (0.743) (0.582) (0.000) (0.695) (0.374) 
Price of Loans (-1) 0.627*** 0.783*** 0.652*** 0.774*** 0.634*** 0.798*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
PCR  -0.0004** -0.0003* --- --- -0.0006*** -0.0005*** 
 (0.012) (0.087)   (0.000) (0.005) 
PCB  --- --- 0.0006*** -0.00004 0.0006*** -0.00002 
   (0.000) (0.593) (0.008) (0.794) 
GDPpcg 0.0006 0.000005 0.0002 0.00007 0.0002 0.0003 
 (0.101) (0.992) (0.413) (0.874) (0.447) (0.390) 
Inflation  0.0005*** 0.001*** 0.0005*** 0.0005 0.0005*** 0.0006** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.004) (0.114) (0.006) (0.043) 
Pop. density 0.00002* 0.00001 0.00006*** 0.000008 0.00008*** 0.013 
 (0.099) (0.322) (0.002) (0.505) (0.001) (0.364) 
Deposit/Assets 0.050*** 0.043 0.053*** 0.028 0.052*** -0.0004 
 (0.000) (0.143) (0.000) (0.206) (0.000) (0.120) 
Bank Branches -0.0003 -0.0002 -0.001*** -0.0007** -0.0009*** 0.079 
 (0.123) (0.404) (0.000) (0.019) (0.009) (0.353) 
AR(1) (0.000) (0.624) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.004) 
AR(2) (0.969) (0.764) (0.998) (0.009) (0.695) (0.003) 
Sargan OIR (0.003) (0.879) (0.000) (0.258) (0.000) (0.785) 
Hansen OIR (0.020) (0.591) (0.003) (0.067) (0.015) (0.140) 
DHT for instruments       
(a)Instruments in levels       
H excluding group (0.018) (0.584) (0.003) (0.481) (0.033) (0.463) 
Dif(null, H=exogenous) (0.149) (0.504) (0.082) (0.040) (0.074) (0.099) 
(b) IV (years, eq(diff))       
H excluding group (0.060) (0.371) (0.064) (0.015) (0.110) (0.128) 
Dif(null, H=exogenous) (0.067) (0.817) (0.005) (0.848) (0.018) (0.346) 
       
Fisher  56.14*** 47.64*** 30.18*** 44.30*** 36.53*** 80.41*** 
Instruments  34 33 34 32 38 36 
Banks  144 112 144 109 144 106 
Observations  698 140 690 138 678 132 
       
*,**,***: significance levels of 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. DHT: Difference in Hansen Test for Exogeneity of Instruments’ Subsets. Dif: 
Difference. OIR: Over-identifying Restrictions Test. The significance of bold values is twofold. 1) The significance of estimated coefficients 
and the Fisher statistics. 2) The failure to reject the null hypotheses of: a) no autocorrelation in the AR(1) and AR(2) tests and; b) the validity 
of the instruments in the Sargan OIR test. The full sample is from 2001-2011 whereas the partial sample is from 2005-2011. 
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Table 2: Quantity Effects of Reducing Information Asymmetry  
       
 Dependent Variable: Quantity of Loans 
       
 Public  Credit Registries (PCR) Private Credit Bureaus (PCB) Information Sharing Offices 
 Full Sample Partial Sample Full Sample Partial Sample Full Sample Partial Sample 
Constant  0.095 0.121 0.286*** 0.074 0.292*** 0.249 
 (0.179) (0.710) (0.000) (0.362) (0.000) (0.208) 
Quantity of Loans(-1) 0.991*** 1.003*** 0.946*** 1.006*** 0.943*** 1.009*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
PCR  -0.0003 0.0004 --- --- -0.0004 -0.0002 
 (0.542) (0.685)   (0.560) (0.817) 
PCB  --- --- -0.003*** 0.00005 -0.002*** -0.0005 
   (0.004) (0.888) (0.004) (0.280) 
GDPpcg 0.005*** 0.006* 0.005*** 0.006** 0.005*** 0.006** 
 (0.003) (0.080) (0.004) (0.033) (0.002) (0.042) 
Inflation  0.001 -0.0008 0.002** 0.0002 0.002*** -0.001 
 (0.246) (0.573) (0.010) (0.866) (0.006) (0.311) 
Pop. density 0.00008 -0.00003 -0.0001* 0.00005 -0.0002** -0.00001 
 (0.131) (0.729) (0.059) (0.282) (0.019) (0.828) 
Deposit/Assets -0.020 0.133 0.009 -0.001 0.024 0.033 
 (0.824) (0.394) (0.912) (0.992) (0.760) (0.793) 
Bank Branches -0.002** -0.004** 0.001 -0.002* 0.001 -0.003** 
 (0.023) (0.015) (0.351) (0.096) (0.293) (0.030) 
AR(1) (0.000) (0.681) (0.000) (0.256) (0.000) (0.158) 
AR(2) (0.549) (0.919) (0.612) (0.974) (0.874) (0.844) 
Sargan OIR (0.000) (0.030) (0.001) (0.004) (0.004) (0.081) 
Hansen OIR (0.001) (0.366) (0.107) (0.372) (0.094) (0.290) 
DHT for instruments       
(a)Instruments in levels       
H excluding group (0.951) (0.579) (0.685) (0.337) (0.691) (0.351) 
Dif(null, H=exogenous) (0.000) (0.262) (0.042) (0.406) (0.034) (0.298) 
(b) IV (years, eq(diff))       
H excluding group (0.003) (0.371) (0.077) (0.298) (0.028) (0.380) 
Dif(null, H=exogenous) (0.023) (0.364) (0.390) (0.587) (0.785) (0.202) 
       
Fisher  869.92*** 1162.24*** 467.63*** 2897.38*** 517.49*** 1384.66*** 
Instruments  34 34 34 30 38 35 
Banks 145 115 145 112 145 137 
Observations  735 115 728 144 715 137 
       
*,**,***: significance levels of 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. DHT: Difference in Hansen Test for Exogeneity of Instruments’ Subsets. Dif: 
Difference. OIR: Over-identifying Restrictions Test. The significance of bold values is twofold. 1) The significance of estimated coefficients 
and the Fisher statistics. 2) The failure to reject the null hypotheses of: a) no autocorrelation in the AR(1) and AR(2) tests and; b) the validity 
of the instruments in the Sargan OIR test. The full sample is from 2001-2011 whereas the partial sample is from 2005-2011. 
 
 
 Tables 3 and 4 present QR findings corresponding respectively to loan price and loan 
quantity. Like with GMM findings, each table has three sets of specifications corresponding 
to public credit registries, private credit bureaus and information sharing offices (including 
both public credit registries and private credit bureaus). Consistent differences in information 
sharing offices estimated coefficients between OLS and quintiles (in terms of sign, 
significance and magnitude of significance) justify the relevance of adopting the empirical 
strategy. 
16 
 
 The following findings can be established from Table 3. Public credit registries 
consistently decrease the price of loans whereas private credit bureaus consistently have the 
opposite effect. Most of the significant control variables have the expected signs. In Table 4, 
public credit registries increase loan quantity in bottom quintiles while private credit bureaus 
increase loan quantity in top quintiles.  
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Table 3: Price Effects of Reducing Information Asymmetry (IV QR) 
                   
 Dependent Variables: Price of Loans 
 Public  Credit Registries (PCR) Private Credit Bureaus (PCB) Information Sharing Offices 
 OLS Q.10 Q.25 Q.50 Q.75 Q.90 OLS Q.10 Q.25 Q.50 Q.75 Q.90 OLS Q.10 Q.25 Q.50 Q.75 Q.90 
Constant  0.080*** 0.051*** 0.065*** 0.073*** 0.091*** 0.098*** 0.072*** 0.062*** 0.056*** 0.061*** 0.078*** 0.091*** 0.075*** 0.055*** 0.059*** 0.065*** 0.085*** 0.097*** 
 (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
PCR (IV) -0.001*** -
0.001*** 
-0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** --- --- --- --- --- --- -0.001*** -0.001 
*** 
-
0.001*** 
-0.001*** -
0.001*** 
-0.001 
*** 
 (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)       (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
PCB (IV) --- --- --- --- --- --- 0.0005*** 0.0007*** 0.0005*** 0.0004*** 0.0002** 0.0003*** 0.0004*** 0.0006*** 0.0003**
* 
0.0003**
* 
0.0002* 0.0002* 
       (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.030) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.062) (0.061) 
GDPpcg -0.0007* 0.0002 -0.00008 -0.0006 0.0007 -0.001* -0.0004 0.0003 -0.0001 -0.0003 -0.00002 -0.00002 -0.0003 0.0007 0.00009 -0.0001 -0.0004 -0.0007 
 (0.075) (0.820) (0.855) (0.185) (0.114) (0.084) (0.298) (0.625) (0.847) (0.489) (0.965) (0.958) (0.352) (0.331) (0.854) (0.797) (0.504) (0.238) 
Inflation  0.001*** 0.0003 0.001*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.003*** 0.002*** 0.0005 0.001*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.003*** 0.001*** 0.0008 0.001*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 
 (0.000) (0.605) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.212) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.126) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Pop. density 0.00007*** 0.00006 0.00007*** 0.00008*** 0.00007*** 0.00007*** 0.00005*** 0.00006** 0.00003* 0.00005*** 0.00005*** 0.00007*** 0.00009*** 0.00007** 0.00008*
** 
0.00009*
** 
0.00009*
** 
0.00008*
** 
 (0.000) (0.169) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.013) (0.087) (0.003) (0.005) (0.000) (0.000) (0.030) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.002) 
Deposit/Assets 0.017** 0.009 0.012* 0.018** 0.022** 0.032** 0.022*** -0.004 0.022** 0.027*** 0.031*** 0.040*** 0.019*** -0.006 0.017** 0.022*** 0.022* 0.037*** 
 (0.016) (0.513) (0.099) (0.024) (0.014) (0.016) (0.001) (0.620) (0.038) (0.003) (0.005) (0.000) (0.014) (0.559) (0.037) (0.055) (0.055) (0.003) 
Bank Branches -0.001*** -0.0003 -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.0003 -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.001*** -0.002*** -0.001*** -0.001 
*** 
-
0.001*** 
-0.001*** -
0.001*** 
-0.0004 
 (0.000) (0.930) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.374) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0..000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.003) (0.341) 
Small Banks  0.006* 0.009 0.007* 0.0003 -0.0001 0.004 0.005 0.005 0.0005 0.003 0.003 0.007 0.005 0.007 0.004 0.0009 0.001*** 0.002 
 (0.098) (0.271) (0.077) (0.944) (0.977) (0.520) (0.144) (0.378) (0.928) (0.520) (0.575) (0.214) (0.168) (0.282) (0.309) (0.835) (0.003) (0.746) 
Domestic Banks 0.001 -0.014* -0.001 0.007** 0.008** 0.001 -0.001 -0.012** -0.001 0.003 0.005 0.001 -0.001 -0.016 
*** 
-0.002 0.004 0.006 0.001 
 (0.581) (0.050) (0.604) (0.043) (0.045) (0.783) (0.714) (0.021) (0.798) (0.434) (0.326) (0.797) (0.693) (0.005) (0.556) (0.279) (0.260) (0.846) 
Islamic Banks  -0.017** 0.0002 -0.015* -0.018* -0.011 -0.014 -0.013** -0.002 -0.008 -0.010 -0.012 -0.018 -0.011* 0.0007 -0.009 -0.011 -0.009 -0.010 
 (0.010) (0.987) (0.054) (0.056) (0.263) (0.299) (0.031) (0.844) (0.457) (0.293) (0.341) (0.111) (0.076) (0.952) (0.305) (0.228) (0.490) (0.457) 
Pseudo R²/R² 0.211 0.088 0.144 0.157 0.147 0.134 0.223 0.124 0.152 0.155 0.143 0.132 0.241 0.132 0.165 0.171 0.157 0.141 
Fisher  25.31***      25.40***      25.06***      
Observations  730 730 730 730 730 730 731 731 731 731 731 731 710 710 710 710 710 710 
                   
***,**,*: significance levels of 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. IV: Instrumented Variable. OLS: Ordinary Least Squares. R² (Pseudo R²) for OLS (Quantile Regressions). Lower quantiles (e.g., Q 0.1) signify nations 
where price of loans is least. Bold values represent significant estimated coefficients and significant Fisher statistics for the overall validity of the model.  
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Table 4: Quantity Effects of Reducing Information Asymmetry (QR) 
                   
 Dependent Variable: Quantity of Loans 
 Public  Credit Registries (PCR) Private Credit Bureaus (PCB) Information Sharing Offices 
 OLS Q.10 Q.25 Q.50 Q.75 Q.90 OLS Q.10 Q.25 Q.50 Q.75 Q.90 OLS Q.10 Q.25 Q.50 Q.75 Q.90 
Constant  3.971*** 2.800*** 3.146*** 3.743*** 4.959*** 5.369*** 3.824*** 2.521*** 2.939*** 3.685*** 4.864*** 5.177*** 3.846*** 2.682*** 3.040*** 3.665*** 4.859*** 5.159*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
PCR (IV) 0.012** 0.012* 0.032*** 0.014 -0.005 -0.001 --- --- --- --- --- --- 0.009 0.015** 0.027** 0.008 -0.010 0.001 
 (0.044) (0.051) (0.004) (0.254) (0.609) (0.879)       (0.130) (0.023) (0.017) (0.462) (0.316) (0.823) 
PCB (IV) --- --- --- --- --- --- 0.001 0.003 0.001 -0.007* 0.005* 0.003* 0.0007 0.0006 0.001 -0.006** 0.003 0.003 
       (0.624) (0.128) (0.750) (0.051) (0.078) (0.080) (0.781) (0.794) (0.713) (0.048) (0.194) (0.114) 
GDPpcg -0.017 0.022** -0.021 -0.039* -0.019 -
0.037*** 
-0.009 0.016* -0.015 -0.035 -0.018 -
0.024*** 
-0.012 0.025** -0.018 -0.038** -0.014 -
0.026*** 
 (0.140) (0.025) (0.209) (0.057) (0.172) (0.001) (0.434) (0.082) (0.450) (0.107) (0.245) (0.009) (0.284) (0.017) (0.330) (0.033) (0.332) (0.004) 
Inflation  -
0.028*** 
-
0.017*** 
-0.011 -
0.042*** 
-
0.030*** 
-0.017** -
0.023*** 
-0.012** -0.013 -
0.034*** 
-
0.025*** 
-0.008 -
0.026*** 
-
0.017*** 
-0.013 -
0.035*** 
-
0.029*** 
-0.013** 
 (0.000) (0.003) (0.256) (0.000) (0.000) (0.010) (0.000) (0.023) (0.245) (0.006) (0.002) (0.109) (0.000) (0.004) (0.222) (0.001) (0.001) (0.019) 
Pop. density -
0.001*** 
-
0.001*** 
-
0.002*** 
-0.001 -
0.001*** 
-
0.001*** 
-
0.001*** 
-0.0007 
*** 
-0.0005 -0.0008 -
0.001*** 
-
0.0009** 
-
0.001*** 
-
0.001*** 
-0.001** -0.001 -0.0009 -
0.0009** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.138) (0.006) (0.009) (0.002) (0.003) (0.297) (0.238) (0.009) (0.011) (0.001) (0.000) (0.041) (0.120) (0.102) (0.011) 
Deposit/Assets 1.860*** 1.260*** 1.953*** 2.400*** 1.336*** 1.153*** 1.925*** 1.333*** 1.984*** 2.260*** 1.474*** 1.297*** 1.931*** 1.403*** 2.046*** 2.304*** 1.443*** 1.357*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Bank Branches -
0.048*** 
-
0.015*** 
-
0.038*** 
-
0.060*** 
-
0.049*** 
-
0.040*** 
-
0.042*** 
-0.005 -0.027** -
0.041*** 
-
0.055*** 
-
0.039*** 
-
0.047*** 
-
0.018*** 
-
0.037*** 
-
0.048*** 
-
0.046*** 
-
0.042*** 
 (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.378) (0.040) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Small Banks  -
0.742*** 
-
1.023*** 
-
1.261*** 
-
0.716*** 
-0.338** -0.190 -
0.757*** 
-
0.957*** 
-
1.191*** 
-
0.714*** 
-
0.413*** 
-
0.278*** 
-
0.706*** 
-
1.037*** 
-
1.235*** 
-
0.671*** 
-
0.390*** 
-0.192** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.011) (0.110) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.007) (0.004) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.007) (0.047) 
Domestic Banks 0.410*** 0.046 0.417*** 0.463*** 0.582*** -
1.507*** 
0.379*** 0.026 0.461*** 0.517*** 0.563*** 0.482*** 0.420*** 0.107 0.433** 0.543*** 0.553*** 0.436*** 
 (0.000) (0.658) (0.007) (0.005) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.778) (0.009) (0.003) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.338) (0.010) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Islamic Banks  -
0.608*** 
0.333 -0.154 -0.351 -
1.354*** 
-
1.507*** 
-
0.513*** 
0.498** 0.086 -0.385 -
1.342*** 
-
1.290*** 
-
0.585*** 
0.310 -0.067 -0.436 -
1.308*** 
-
1.341*** 
 (0.000) (0.143) (0.677) (0.362) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.018) (0.834) (0.338) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.197) (0.865) (0.188) (0.000) (0.000) 
Pseudo R²/R² 0.194 0.075 0.114 0.150 0.102 0.114 0.190 0.074 0.105 0.149 0.107 0.119 0.193 0.081 0.119 0.150 0.103 0.116 
Fisher  36.98***      36.88***      32.45***      
Observations  753 753 753 753 753 753 756 756 756 756 756 756 733 733 733 733 733 733 
                   
***,**,*: significance levels of 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. IV: Instrumented Variable. OLS: Ordinary Least Squares. R² (Pseudo R²) for OLS (Quantile Regressions). Lower quantiles (e.g., Q 0.1) signify nations 
where quantity of loans is least. Bold values represent significant estimated coefficients and significant Fisher statistics for the overall validity of the model.  
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4.2 Further discussion of results and policy implications 
 
 This section is engaged in two main strands, namely: the nexus with the literature and 
implication of the findings.  First, on the relationship with existing literature, beyond the 
established significant estimates in distinct quintiles of loan quantity and price (which we 
discuss in the second strand), the main findings can be summarised as follows: while both 
information sharing offices are important for increasing loan quantity, public credit registries 
are comparatively better for financial access because they decrease loan prices compared to 
private credit bureaus that increase it.  Hence, in the narrative that follows it  is assumed that 
public credit registries have an edge in reducing financing constraints.  
 From a broad angle, the findings are in accordance with Singh et al. (2009) who have 
reached the conclusion that African countries which promote information sharing offices 
enjoy higher levels of financial access. The findings are also in line with Galindo and Miller 
(2001) in the view that countries with comparatively improved credit registries would enjoy 
less restrictions to financial access compared to their counterparts with less developed 
information sharing offices. This narrative accords with this study because private credit 
bureaus are relatively undeveloped compared to public credit registries. Appendix 5 which 
substantiates this perspective shows that many countries have public credit registries 
compared to private credit bureaus.  
 The findings are not in agreement with Love and Mylenko (2003) because they have 
concluded that private credit bureaus are linked to higher levels of financial access while 
public credit registries do not have any substantial effect in mitigating financial access 
constraints.  Our results do not also align with   Triki and Gajigo (2014) who have established 
that financial access is comparatively higher in nations with private credit bureaus compared 
to those with public credit registries or neither institution.  
 In the second strand, the following implication is directly derivable from the findings. 
(1)  Public credit registries are more useful in increasing financial access from banks with 
comparatively low levels of quantity of loans and private credit bureaus are more instrumental 
in improving financial access from banks with comparatively high levels of quantity of loans. 
As a direct policy implication, in order to increase loan quantity, public credit registries 
should target banks offering comparatively lower quantity of loans while private credit 
bureaus should target banks offering higher quantity of loans.  
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5. Conclusion and future research directions  
 The purpose of this study has been to assess how information sharing offices affect 
loan price and quantity in the African banking industry. The empirical evidence is based on a 
panel of 162 banks in 42 countries for the period 2001-2011.  From the Generalised Method 
of Moments, public credit registries decrease loan prices. With instrumental Quantile 
Regressions, two main findings are established. Public credit registries consistently decrease 
the price of loans whereas private credit bureaus consistently have the opposite effect. Public 
credit registries increase loan quantity in bottom quintiles (or banks associated with lower 
loan quantities) while private credit bureaus increase loan quantity in top quintiles (or banks 
associated with higher loan quantities).  
 Future studies can improve the extant literature by assessing the role of information 
and communication technologies in the established linkages. Furthermore, engaging country-
specific inquiries is worthwhile for more targeted policy implications.  
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Appendices 
Appendix 1: Summary of expected signs  
  
Variables 
Expected sign on loan 
price 
Expected sign on loan 
quantity 
    
Bank-oriented 
features  
Deposit/Asset ratio   + + 
Bank Branches  - + 
    
Market-related 
characteristics  
GDP per capita growth Uncertain  + 
Population density  + + 
Inflation  + - 
    
Characteristics of the 
unobserved 
heterogeneity  
Small versus(vs). Big  banks Uncertain Uncertain 
domestic vs. foreign  banks Uncertain Uncertain 
Islamic vs. non-Islamic  banks Uncertain Uncertain 
    
 
 
Appendix 2: Variable Definitions 
Variables  Signs Variable Definitions Sources 
    
Quantity   Qty Logarithm of Loans   BankScope 
    
Price (charged on 
Loans or Quantity) 
Price (Gross Interest and Dividend income +Total 
Non-Interest Operating Income)/Total Assets 
BankScope 
    
Public credit registries   PCR Public credit registry coverage (% of adults) WDI (World Bank) 
    
Private credit bureaus  PCB Private credit bureaus coverage (% of adults) WDI (World Bank) 
    
GDP per capita  GDP GDP per capita growth (annual %) WDI (World Bank) 
    
Inflation  Infl. Consumer Price Index (annual %) WDI (World Bank) 
    
Populaton density  Pop. People per square kilometers of land area WDI (World Bank) 
    
Deposits/Assets  D/A Deposits  on Total Assets  BankScope 
    
Bank Branches  Bbrchs Number of Bank Branches (Commercial bank 
branches per 100 000 adults) 
BankScope 
    
Small Banks Ssize  Ratio of Bank Assets to Total Assets (Assets 
in all Banks for a given period) ≤ 0.50 
Authors’ calculation 
and BankScope 
    
Large Banks Lsize  Ratio of Bank Assets to Total Assets (Assets 
in all Banks for a given period)>0.50 
Authors’ calculation 
and BankScope 
    
    
Domestic/Foreign 
banks   
Dom/Foreign Domestic/Foreign banks based on qualitative 
information: creation date, headquarters, 
government/private ownership, % of foreign 
ownership, year of foreign/domestic 
ownership…etc 
Authors’ qualitative 
content analysis.  
    
Islamic/Non-Islamic  Islam/NonIsl. Islamic/Non-Islamic banks based on financial 
statement characteristics (trading in 
derivatives and interest on loan 
payments…etc) 
Authors’ qualitative 
content analysis; Beck 
et al. (2010); Ali 
(2012). 
    
WDI: World Development Indicators. GDP: Gross Domestic Product. The following are dummy variables: Ssize, Lsize, Open, 
Close, Dom/Foreign and Islam/NonIsl.   
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Appendix 3: Summary Statistics  
       
  Mean S.D Minimum Maximum Observations 
       
Dependent 
variables  
Price of Loans 0.338 0.929 0.000 25.931 1045 
Quantity of Loans (ln) 3.747 1.342 -0.045 6.438 1091 
       
Independent  Public credit registries  2.056 6.206 0.000 49.800 1240 
variables  Private credit bureaus  7.496 18.232 0.000 64.800 1235 
       
Market 
variables  
GDP per capita 
growth 
13.912 96.707 -15.306 926.61 1782 
Inflation  10.239 22.695 -9.823 325.00 1749 
Population density  81.098 106.06 2.085 633.52 1782 
       
Bank level 
variables  
Deposits/Assets  0.664 0.198 0.000 1.154 1052 
Bank Branches  6.112 6.158 0.383 37.209 1129 
       
 
 
 
Dummy 
variables   
Small Size  0.804 0.396 0.000 1.000 1255 
Large Size  0.195 0.396 0.000 1.000 1255 
Domestic  0.753 0.431 0.000 1.000 1782 
Foreign  0.246 0.431 0.000 1.000 1782 
Islamic  0.037 0.188 0.000 1.000 1782 
Non-Islamic  0.962 0.188 0.000 1.000 1782 
       
Ln: Logarithm. GDP: Gross Domestic Product. S.D: Standard Deviation. GDP: Gross Domestic Product. Indep: Independent. Vble: Variable.  
 
 
 
 
 
Appendix4: Correlation Matrix 
                
Info. Sharing Market-Level Controls Bank-Level Controls Dummy-Controls Dependent Variables  
PCB PCR GDP Infl. Pop. D/A Bbrchs Ssize Lsize Dom. Foreign Islam NonIsl. Price Quantity  
1.00 -0.13 0.022 -0.12 -0.18 -0.10 0.143 0.103 -0.10 0.176 -0.176 -0.080 0.080 0.111 -0.032 PCB 
 1.000 0.040 -0.20 0.435 -0.01 0.553 -0.08 0.084 0.012 -0.012 0.026 -0.026 -0.282 -0.08 PCR 
  1.000 -0.03 -0.08 0.048 -0.057 -0.08 0.085 0.065 -0.065 -0.021 0.021 -0.017 0.021 GDP 
   1.000 -0.05 0.057 -0.012 0.069 -0.06 0.053 -0.053 -0.025 0.025 0.107 0.024 Infl. 
    1.000 0.126 0.350 -0.04 0.040 -0.033 0.033 -0.112 0.112 0.045 -0.128 Pop. 
     1.000 0.028 -0.13 0.135 -0.073 0.073 -0.236 0.236 0.106 0.292 D/A 
      1.000 -0.07 0.076 0.143 -0.143 -0.036 0.036 -0.266 -0.182 Bbrchs 
       1.000 -1.00 0.033 -0.033 0.026 -0.026 0.049 -0.218 Ssize 
        1.000 -0.033 0.033 -0.026 0.026 -0.049 0.218 Lsize 
         1.000 -1.000 0.112 -0.112 0.017 0.038 Dom 
          1.000 -0.112 0.112 -0.017 -0.038 Foreign 
           1.000 -1.000 -0.106 0.116 Islamic 
            1.000 0.106 -0.036 NonIsl. 
             1.000 -0.036 Price 
              1.000 Quantity 
                
Info: Information. PCB: Private Credit Bureaus. PCR: Public credit registries. GDP: GDP per capita growth. Infl: Inflation. Pop: Population 
growth. D/A: Deposit on Total Assets. Bbrchs: Bank branches. Szize: Small banks. Lsize: Large banks. Open: Capital openness. Closed: 
Capital closedness. Domestic: Domestic banks. Foreign: Foreign banks. Islam: Islamic banks. NonIsl: Non-Islamic banks.  Price: Price of 
Loans. Quantity: Quantity of Loans.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
23 
 
Appendix 5: Country-specific average values from information sharing bureaus   
   
 Public Credit Registries  Private Credit Bureaus 
   
1) Algeria 0.216 0 .000 
2) Angola 2.412 0.000 
3) Benin 8.037 0.000 
4) Botswana 0 .000 48.150 
5) Burkina Faso 1.750 0.000 
6) Burundi 0.212 0.000 
7) Cameroon 2.312 0.000 
8) Cape Verde 17.042 0.000 
9) Central African Republic  1.412 0.000 
10) Chad 0.400 0.000 
11) Comoros 0.000 0.000 
12) Congo Democratic Republic 0.000 0.000 
13) Congo Republic 3.400 0.000 
14) Côte d’Ivoire  2.487 0.000 
15) Djibouti 0.200 0.000 
16) Egypt 2.062 5.271 
17) Equatorial Guinea 2.566 0.000 
18) Eritrea 0.000 0.000 
19) Ethiopia  0.087 0.000 
20) Gabon 12.716 0.000 
21) The Gambia 0.000 0.000 
22) Ghana 0.000 1.700 
23) Guinea 0.000 0.000 
24) Guinea-Bissau 1.000 0.000 
25) Kenya 0.000 1.750 
26) Lesotho 0.000 0.000 
27)Liberia 0.280 0.000 
28) Libya na na 
29) Madagascar 0.162 0.000 
30) Malawi 0.000 0.000 
31) Mali 2.812 0.000 
32) Mauritania 0.187 0.000 
33) Mauritius  27.866 0.000 
34) Morocco 1.200 4.812 
35) Mozambique 1.637 0.000 
36) Namibia 0.000 50.362 
37) Niger 0.825 0.000 
38) Nigeria 0.025 0.000 
39) Rwanda 0.425 0.275 
40) Sao Tome & Principe 0.000 0.000 
41) Senegal 3.787 0.000 
42) Seychelles 0.000 0.000 
43) Sierra Leone 0.000 0.000 
44) Somalia na na 
45) South Africa 0.000 57.312 
46) Sudan 0.000 0.000 
47) Swaziland 0.000 40.216 
48) Tanzania 0.000 0.000 
49) Togo 2.550 0.000 
50) Tunisia 15.975 0.000 
51) Uganda 0.000 0.512 
52)Zambia 0.000 0.975 
53) Zimbabwe 0.000 0.000 
   
na: not applicable because of missing observations.  
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